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Chapter Eleven of the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA" or "the
Agreement")a deals with investment and investment disputes. The provisions of this chap-
ter represent great progress toward the creation of a truly open and nondiscriminatory
environment for investment in the United States, Canadian, and Mexican economies by
investors of the NAFTA Parties. Moreover, Chapter 11 constitutes to date the most com-
prehensive investment accord to which the United States is a party. Generally speaking, it
applies to all economic sectors and industries addressed by the NAFTA except the financial
services industry, which is separately governed by Chapter 15 of the Agreement.
Chapter 11 sets forth the standards of nondiscriminatory treatment that the NAFTA
Parties have agreed to extend to investors and investments of one another. In addition, it
establishes a dispute settlement framework that allows NAFTA investors, at their option, to
seek monetary damages through international arbitration in lieu of seeking redress through
the host country's courts or administrative tribunals. The creation of this dispute resolution
mechanism responds directly to one of the most significant concerns of foreign investors: to
what extent will the investors be able to seek redress before an impartial tribunal, and be
accorded due process for daims against the country in which they have invested. The provi-
sions of the investment chapter are intended to create a fairer, more transparent, and more
predictable environment in which NAFTA investors may establish a local presence in Mexico,
Canada, or the United States. Because establishing a local presence is often a critical element
of securing market access in a foreign country, particularly for the service industries, the pro-
visions of Chapter 11 are crucial to the expansion of the economic relationship among the
NAFTA Parties, as intended by the Agreement as a whole.
This article examines the content and the practical effect of Chapter 11, through the
use of a hypothetical investment dispute arising under the NAFTA. Section II of the article
provides a descriptive overview of the chapter's substantive provisions. The basic facts of
our hypothetical investment dispute are set forth in Section III. The third section also
contains an in-depth discussion of issues that are likely to be central to the resolution of an
investment dispute under the NAFTA, including whether the dispute was caused by an
unlawful expropriation by the host NAFTA Party and what monetary damages or other
remedies should be awarded in the event of an unlawful expropriation.
II. NAFTA Chapter Eleven: Investment and Investment Disputes.
For U.S. negotiators, the primary objectives for the investment chapter of the NAFTA
were to liberalize Mexican restrictions on foreign investment and to solidify legal protec-
tions for investors in Mexico. 1 The chapter expands upon recent bilateral investment
treaties the United States has entered into with developing countries. The chapter is also
based on the investment provisions of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement (CFTA). 2 It
a. North American Free Trade Agreement, drafted Aug, 12 1992, revised Sept 6, 1992, U.S.-Can.-
Mex., 32 I.L.M. 605, Entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter"NAFTA"].
1. United States General Accounting Office Report to the Congress, North American Free Trade
Agreement. Assessment of Major Issues, Vol. 2 (Sept. 1993), at 19. [hereinafter "GAO Report"].
2. U.S. Canada Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, U.S.-Can., Pub.L. No. 100-449, reprinted in
27 LLM. 281 (entered into force on January 1, 1989) [hereinafter "CFA"].
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imposes relatively few changes with respect to the investment regime established between
the United States and Canada under the CFTA. Liberalizations between the two that were
implemented under the CFTA are basically maintained under the NAFTA. Similarly, the
obligations of Chapter 11 do not represent great changes to the foreign investment regime
of the United States. The United States has traditionally been relatively open to foreign
investment. It maintains few formal restrictions on foreign investment, except in a few spe-
cific sectors considered sensitive for national security reasons. These sectors include air
transportation services, atomic energy, and certain mining activities.
The greatest degree of positive change engendered by the investment provisions dear-
ly is with respect to Mexico. Prior to the NAFTA negotiations, Mexico had maintained a
severely restricted and regulated foreign investment regime. The Mexican Government
reserved numerous activities for the state, screened most investment proposals, and
imposed substantial performance requirements and price controls. A wide range of eco-
nomic sectors, from petroleum-related activities to telecommunications and cargo trans-
portation services, were closed to foreign ownership. Until December 1993, Mexico main-
tained the "Law to Promote Mexican Investment and to Regulate Foreign Investment;'
under which foreign investors could not own more than 49% of a Mexican enterprise
without government approval. Substantial authority over investments was vested in the
National Foreign Investment Commission.3
The NAFTA's liberalizations expand upon changes that were commenced in Mexico in
the mid- 1980s. Those changes culminated in December 1993, when, in anticipation of the
NAFTA's entry into force, the government of President Carlos Salinas de Gortari enacted a
new foreign investment law.4 The new law incorporates the principles of national treat-
ment, Most-Favored Nation ("MFN") treatment, and the minimum standard of treatment
agreed to in the NAFTA. Under this law, any foreign investor (from a NAFTA Party or
other country) may invest in the shares of a Mexican enterprise, acquire the assets of a
Mexican company, establish a new business in Mexico or expand its current business, sub-
ject to narrower restrictions than in the past. 5 In the NAFTA treaty itself, Mexico's com-
mitments in Chapter 11 represent substantial progress in opening up its economy to for-
eign investment from U.S. and Canadian investors. The extent of the reservations and
exceptions Mexico has taken in the annexes to the chapter indicates, however, that more
progress remains to be made.
Chapter 11 is divided into two parts. Section A sets forth the basic protections each
NAFTA Party is obligated to extend to the investors of another NAFTA Party or to the
investments of such investors in the territory of the Party. The protections apply equally to
investments already in existence at the NAFTs January 1, 1994 entry into force and to
those made after that date. Among the general principles encompassed in the chapter are
the following: national treatment, most-favored nation treatment, nondiscriminatory
treatment, freedom from performance requirements, free transferability of investment-
related capital, and expropriation only in conformity with international standards. The
annexes to the chapter, found in Volume II of the NAFTA, detail each Party's reservations
3. United States International Trade Commission, Review of Trade and Investment Liberalization
Measures by Mexico and Prospects for Future United States-Mexican Relations, Phase I, USITC
Publication 2275, April 1990, pp. 5-2 through 5-13.
4. Ley de Inversion Extranjera, D.O. Dec. 27, 1993.
5. Baker & McKenzie, NAFTA Handbook, 129-130 (1994).
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and exceptions to the obligations imposed by Chapter 11. Section B establishes a mecha-
nism that allows parties to go to international arbitration to resolve investment disputes, in
lieu of local judicial or administrative proceedings.
The scope of the chapter is broad. The term "investment:' as defined by Article 1139
of the NAFTA, includes not only enterprises and equity and debt securities of an enter-
prise, but also real estate, certain contracts and concessions, and intangible property such
as goodwill and intellectual property. A NAFTA "investor" is defined as "a Party or state
enterprise thereof, or a national or an enterprise of such Party, that seeks to make, is mak-
ing or has made a investment." Qualification as a NAFTA "investor" is based on a residen-
cy test. The term thus includes firms that are established in a NAFTA country and have
substantial business activity there, even if they are owned or controlled by non-Party
nationals.6 Finally, the chapter binds not only the Governments of Canada, Mexico, and
the United States (the "NAFTA Parties" or the "Parties") but also state enterprises, such as
Petroleos Mexicanos in Mexico or the Crown corporations in Canada.
A. BASIC OBLIGATIONS OF THE INVESTMENT CHAPTER (SECTION A).
Chapter 11 first sets forth the guiding principles that are to protect NAFTA investors
and their investments. Pursuant to Article 1102, NAFTA Parties must extend national
treatment to investors (and investments) of another Party, meaning treatment no less
favorable than that which it accords its own investors in like circumstances, with respect to
the establishment, acquisition, management, operation, or disposition of such invest-
ments. In addition, the treatment accorded by a state or province of a NAFTA Party must
be no less favorable than the most favorable treatment it accords to investors and invest-
ments of the NAFTA Party of which it forms a part.7 NAFTA Parties must also extend to
one another most-favored nation treatment, or treatment no less favorable than that
which they extend to investors or investments of any other Party or non-Party in like cir-
cumstances. 8 Pursuant to Article 1104, NAFTA Parties must extend "non-discriminatory"
treatment to investors or investments of another Party, meaning the better of national or
most-favored nation treatment. Finally, NAFTA Parties must extend to the investments of
other Parties a "minimum" standard of treatment, which must meet international law
standards of "fair and equitable treatment" and "full protection and security"' 9 This mini-
mum standard of treatment is to be extended to investors and investments of other
NAFTA Parties regardless of whether nationals of that Party receive such treatment by
their own government.10
Chapter 11 provides investors with substantial freedom from performance require-
ments. Article 1106 of the Agreement sets forth seven performance requirements that a
NAFTA Party may not impose or enforce in connection with the establishment, acquisi-
tion, management or operation of an investment of an investor from a NAFTA Party or
6. NAFTA, Supra note 1, art. 1139.
7. Id.,art. 1102(3).
8. Id., art. 1103.
9. Id., art. 1105.
10. Id., art. 1105.
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from a non-Party."1 The elimination of these performance requirements thus applies
equally to Japanese, Korean, and other non-NAFTA investors as it does to NAFTA
investors. With a few exceptions, a NAFTA Party may not impose any of the first five of
the seven prohibited performance requirements as a condition to receive any advantage it
provides, such as a tax concession or other investment incentive. The Parties are, however,
permitted to condition the receipt of an investment-related advantage on compliance with
requirements to locate production, provide a service, train or employ workers, construct or
expand facilities, or carry out research and development, in their territories.12
In addition, with respect to enterprises of other NAFTA Parties that have been estab-
lished in its territory, a Party may not require that senior management positions be filled
with individuals of any particular nationality. A Party may, however, require that a majori-
ty of the board of directors, or any committee thereof, be of a particular nationality, or res-
ident in the territory of the Party, provided that the requirement does not materially
impair the ability of the NAFTA investors to exercise control over their investments. 13
Under Article 1109, each Party is obligated to permit all transfers and international
payments, related to an investment of an investor of another Party, to be made freely and
without delay into or out of that Party. Such transfers include profits, dividends, interest,
capital gains, proceeds from the sale or liquidation of the investment, loan repayments,
and payments arising out of an investment dispute. This prohibition on most transfer
restrictions is important to investors who are evaluating and attempting to mitigate the
risks of investing in developing countries such as Mexico. 14 Pursuant to this provision, the
Parties must permit transfers to be made in a freely usable currency at the market rate of
exchange. The Parties are permitted, however, to prevent transfers through the non-dis-
criminatory and good-faith application of specified laws, such as bankruptcy laws or secu-
rities regulations.
11. Article 1106 prohibits Parties from requiring that an investment in their territories: (a) to
export a given level or percentage of goods or services; (b) to achieve a given level or percent-
age of domestic content; (c) to purchase, use or accord a preference to goods produced or ser-
vices provided in its territory, or purchase goods or services from persons in its territory; (d)
to relate in any way the volume or value of imports to the volume or value of exports or to the
amount of foreign exchange inflows associated with such investment; (e) to restrict sales of
goods or services in its territory that such investment produces or provides by relating such
sales in any way to the volume or value of its exports or foreign exchange earnings; (f) to
transfer technology, a production process or other proprietary knowledge to a person in their
territory, except when the requirement is imposed or the commitment or undertaking is
enforced by a court, administrative tribunal, or competition authority to remedy an alleged
violation of competition laws or to act in a manner not inconsistent with other provisions of
the NAFTA; or, (g) to act as the exclusive supplier of the goods it produces or services it pro-
vides to a specific region or world market. Id., art. 1106.
12. Id., art. 1106 (3)-(4).
13. Id., art. 1107.
14. Report of the Industry Sector Advisory Committee on Services (ISAC 13) on the North
American Free Trade Agreement (Sept. 14, 1992), at 7. [hereinafter "ISAC Report"].
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Chapter 11 also provides protection to investors of a NAFTA Party in the event of the
nationalization or expropriation of their investments by another Party. Article 1110 pro-
hibits uncompensated nationalization or expropriation of a foreign investment. The arti-
cle states, "No Party shall directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment of
an investor of another Party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to nationaliza-
tion or expropriation of such an investment..." Article 1110 of the NAFTA would only
allow a Party to "take" an investment where it is done (1) for a public purpose; (2) on a
non-discriminatory basis; (3) in accordance with due process of law and international law;
and, (4) on payment of adequate compensation. Actions taken by a local or state govern-
ment of a NAFTA Party are not exempted from this general prohibition. Compensation is
to be equivalent to the fair market value of the expropriated investment immediately
before the expropriation took place, plus any applicable interest. 15 Among the criteria to
be used in determining the fair market value are going concern value and asset value,
including the declared tax value of tangible property.16 Compensation is to be paid with-
out delay and is to be fully realizable. 17 In addition, an investor may challenge certain tax-
ation measures as being tantamount to an expropriation.' 8 Such a challenge is to be
referred to the tax authorities of the relevant NAFTA country.19 If the tax authorities fail
to consider the dispute, or fail to agree within six months that the taxation measure was
not an expropriation, the investor may invoke the investment dispute resolution provisions
of Chapter 11.20
The investment chapter also provides that no Party shall be prevented from adopting,
maintaining, or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with the chapter that it con-
siders appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its territory is conducted in a man-
ner sensitive to environmental concerns. The Parties acknowledge that it is inappropriate
to encourage investment by relaxing health, safety or environmental measures, and they
agree to engage in bilateral consultations if one Party believes that another Party has
offered such an encouragement. 21
1. Reservations and Exceptions to Obligations Under Chapter ).
Article 1108, in conji1nction with Annexes I, II, III, and IV of Volume II of the
Agreement, sets forth the reservations and exceptions the Parties have agreed to establish
with respect to the investment chapter.22 In most cases, the reservations and exceptions
taken by the Parties exempt certain non-conforming measures from the obligations of
15. NAFTA, Supra note 1, art. 1110 (2) and (4).
16. Id., art. 1110 (2).
17. Id., art. 1110 (3).
18. GAO Report, Supra note 2 at 23.
19. Id
20. Id.
21. NAFTA, Supra note 1, art. 1114.
22. The reservations taken in Annexes I and II also pertain to Chapter 12 on Cross-Border Trade
in Services and Chapter 14 on Financial Services.
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Articles 1102 (National Treatment), 1103 (Most-Favored Nation Treatment), 1106
(Performance Requirements), and 1107 (Senior Management/Boards of Directors). 23
At the federal level, each NAFTA Party is allowed to maintain and renew non-con-
forming measures that it has set out in its Annex I schedule. Reservations found in Annex
I relate to, for example, the acquisition of property rights over certain areas of land and
water (Mexico), the distribution, storage, or sale of liquified petroleum gas (Mexico), the
acquisition of rights-of-way for oil or gas pipelines (the United States), and the provision
of domestic air service (the United States). Each Party's Annex I schedule also contains the
Party's liberalization commitments relating to the phase-out (over a ten-year period, for
example) of certain of its reservations. The reservations listed in Annex I are subject to the
so-called "ratchet rule," meaning that any change or amendment to these non-conforming
measures may increase, but not decrease, their conformity with NAFTA obligations.
Among the most significant of the Annex I reservations - and the most vexing to U.S.
negotiators - are those that relate to Canada's and Mexico's laws for the screening of for-
eign investments. These reservations follow precedent set in the CFTA. Pursuant to its
Annex I schedule, Mexico reserves the right to review direct or indirect acquisitions by U.S.
or Canadian investors of more than 49 percent of the ownership interest in a Mexican
enterprise, when the gross assets of the Mexican enterprise exceed a specified threshold.24
Under the Investment Canada Act, investments above a certain monetary threshold by
"non-Canadians" are subject to review, including all direct acquisitions of Canadian busi-
nesses with assets of C$5 million or more and all indirect acquisitions of Canadian busi-
nesses with assets of C$50 million or more.25
Annex II lists additional reservations taken by each NAFTA Party, for which the Party
may maintain existing, or may adopt new or more restrictive, measures that fail to conform
with the obligations of the investment chapter. These reservations are thus not subject to
the "ratchet rule" of Annex I. Sectors reserved under Annex II include basic telecommuni-
cations, air traffic control, and maritime transportation services.
Annex III lists Mexico's constitutionally based exceptions to the investment chapter, in
which private equity investment is prohibited under Mexican law. In this Annex, Mexico
has reserved the right to perform exclusively, and to refuse to permit the establishment of
investments in, eleven general categories of activities. These include exploration and
exploitation of crude oil and natural gas, the generation of nuclear energy, and the opera-
tion and control of traffic within the Mexican railway system. Annex III reservations are
subject to the "ratchet rule' Moreover, when Mexico privatizes its state companies, it is
obligated under the NAFTA to sell such assets on a non-discriminatory basis to investors
23. Because the NAFTA does not provide for any new liberalization commitments between the
United States and Canada, the investment restrictions protected under the CFTA are contin-
ued under the NAFTA.
24. For investors and investments from Canada or the United States, the applicable threshold
increases, for most sectors, from $25 million to $150 million over the course of 10 years.
25. For U.S. and Mexican investors, the screening is limited, as under the CFTA, to direct acquisi-
tions in excess of C$150 million. That threshold increases over time according to a formula
set out in Annex I. No review is required for indirect acquisitions of Canadian businesses by
U.S. or Mexican investors. Investments subject to review under the Investment Canada Act
must be found to be of likely "net benefit" to Canada in order to be approved.
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from NAFTA Parties, subject to a maximum three-year reservation. 26
Annex IV provides a schedule of the exceptions each NAFTA Party takes with respect
to its Most-Favored Nation obligation for treatment accorded under all bilateral or multi-
lateral international agreements in force or signed prior to the NAFTAs entry into force.
For subsequent international agreements, the Parties have taken an exception from Most-
Favored Nation obligations for treatment accorded under agreements involving aviation,
fisheries, maritime matters, and telecommunications transport networks and services.
Under Article 1108, non-conforming measures maintained by state or provincial gov-
ernments are grandfathered for two years following the entry into force of the Agreement.
Upon the expiration of that period, they must be specifically identified and set out in the
Schedules to Annex I in order to maintain their grandfathered status, subject to the ratchet
rule. All existing, non-conforming measures of local governments are grandfathered,
meaning they are exempted from the obligations of Chapter 11 on a permanent basis, sub-
ject to the ratchet rule.
The national treatment and Most-Favored Nation obligations of the investment chap-
ter do not apply to government procurements by NAFTA Parties or their state enterprises
or to subsidies or grants provided by a NAFTA Party or state enterprise. 27 In addition,
some of the restrictions on performance requirements do not apply with respect to export
promotion and foreign 'aid programs or to government procurement.
Finally, at the insistence of U.S. negotiators, the NAFTA includes a national security
exemption that enables each Party to restrict investments for national security reasons. 28
This exception allows the United States to continue to investigate and prohibit or suspend
foreign acquisitions or mergers because of their possible impact on U.S. national security,
pursuant to the Exon-Florio Amendment to the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act
of 1988.29 At the insistence of Canadian negotiators, Canada maintains its CFTA exemp-
tion for "cultural industries,' as set forth in Chapter 21 of the NAFTA. Canada's cultural
industries exception provides that any investment by a non-Canadian, by establishment of
a new business or by acquisition of an existing business, in a cultural industry may be
reviewed by the Investment Canada Agency.30
B. INvEsTmENT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (SEcTION B).
. Chapter Eleven, Section B establishes a mechanism for the settlement, via internation-
al arbitration, of disputes arising from an alleged breach of the investment provisions of
the NAFTA. U.S. participants in the NAFTA negotiations were eager to secure access to
international arbitration for investor disputes under the Agreement.3 1 Inclusion of the
26. NAFTA, Supra note 1, annex III (c). This rule applies to activities reserved to the state on
January 1, 1992 but not specifically reserved under the NAFTA. If Mexican law is amended to
allow private equity investment in activities set forth in Annex III, Mexico may impose restric-
tions on foreign investment participation and describe them in Annex I. See Annex HI(B).
27. Id., art. 1108 (7).
28. Id., art. 2102.
29. GAO Report, supra note 2 at 25.
30. Cultural" industries include filmmaking, television production, and magazine publishing.
31. GAO Report, supra note 2 at 24.
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Chapter 11 mechanism is regarded as an important accomplishment in light of Mexico's
historic opposition to international arbitration for investment disputes. 32 Foreign
investors' worries about Mexico have long been exacerbated by the presence of the so-
called "Calvo Clause" in Mexico's Constitution, which has precluded foreign investors from
invoking the assistance of their home governments in presenting any international claim
on their behalf.33 The Calvo Clause has worked to prevent foreign investors in Mexico
from seeking help from their own governments, at the risk of forfeiting their investments
to the Mexican Government. Their only avenue for redress was before local Mexican
courts. With the establishment of the Chapter 11 dispute settlement mechanism, the
NAFTA Parties effectively nullified the Calvo Clause with respect to U.S. and Canadian
investors in Mexico.
Unlike the dispute settlement provisions of NAFTA Chapters 19 and 20, under which
only a Party may bring a claim, the dispute settlement mechanism of Chapter 11 creates
private rights that can be invoked by NAFTA investors or enterprises. An investor acting
on behalf of himself or on behalf of an enterprise may submit a claim for dispute settle-
ment under this chapter. Claims submitted to arbitration under Chapter 11 may thus be
based on allegations of direct injury to an investor or of indirect injury to an investor
caused by injury to an enterprise or other investment owned or controlled by the
investor. 34 The investments that are the basis of a claim for relief under this dispute settle-
ment mechanism must be owned or controlled directly or indirectly by an investor of a
NAFTA Party. Claims may be submitted to arbitration under the Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States (the
ICSID Convention), if both the disputing Party and the Party of the investor are parties to
the ICSID Convention; the Additional Facility Rules of ICSID, if either the disputing Party
or the Party of the investor, but not both, is a party to the ICSID Convention; or, the
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.35 Although the United States and Canada are parties to the
ICSID Convention, Mexico is not a party. Accordingly, only the latter two options would
be available for an arbitration involving Mexico.
1. Standing and Jurisdiction.
Under this mechanism, an investor of a NAFTA Party may submit to arbitration a
claim that another Party has breached its obligations under Chapter 11 and that the
investor has incurred loss or damage because of that breach. Investors must submit
claims, on behalf of themselves or their enterprise, within three years of the date they first
acquired, or should have acquired, knowledge of the alleged breach and resulting loss or
damages. 36 The dispute resolution mechanism applies to disputes involving actions taken
32. Jose Luis Siqueiros, "Arbitral Autonomy and National Sovereign Authority in Latin America,"
in Lex Mercatoria and Arbitration (ed. Thomas E. Carbonneau) at 184 (1990).
33. (Mexican Constitution) Constitucion Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, art. 27. See also
GAO Report, supra note 2 at 24; Torres Landa, Juan Francisco, "The Changing Times: Foreign
Investment in Mexico" 23 N.Y.U. T. INT'L L. & POL. 801, 808 (1991) (explaining that "a Calvo
Clause considers a foreign investor as a national with respect to his investment, thereby deny-
ing him recourse to the protection of his state of nationality.').
34. NAFTA, Supranote 1, art. 1116,1117.
35. Id., art. 1120.
36. Id., arts. 1116, 1117.
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by political subdivisions of a NAFTA Party.37 It does not apply, however, to disputes that
an investor from one Party may have with private parties in the NAFTA country in which
it invests. Such disputes must be adjudicated in local court or administrative proceedings
or before such courts or tribunals as agreed upon by the parties.
Pursuant to Article 1118, disputing parties (i.e., the investor(s) and the NAFTA Party
alleged to have breached its Chapter 11 obligations) should attempt to settle a claim
through consultations or negotiations before submitting it to arbitration. The disputing
investor must deliver to the disputing NAFTA Party written notice of its intent to submit a
claim to arbitration at least 90 days before doing so. 38 In addition, the dispute settlement
provisions indude a built-in six-month conciliation time, whereby a disputing investor
must let at least six months elapse between the events giving rise to a claim and submission
of the daim to arbitration. 39
Disputing investors must comply with several other conditions before they may sub-
mit a claim to arbitration. Investors must first provide their written consent to arbitration.
Investors must also waive their right to initiate or continue before any administrative tri-
bunal or court under the law of any Party or any other proceedings with respect to the
alleged breach of that Party's NAFTA obligations. 40 However, investors may initiate or
continue to pursue injunctive, declaratory, or other relief not involving the payment of
damages. Both the consent and waiver must be in writing, must be delivered to the dis-
puting Party, and must be induded in the submission of the claim to arbitration.4 1
Access to arbitration under Chapter 11 is strictly precluded under certain circum-
stances. Pursuant to Annex 1120.1, investors from the United States or Canada may not
allege that Mexico has breached its Chapter 11 obligations both in a Chapter 11 arbitration
and in proceedings before a Mexican court or administrative tribunal. Therefore, if U.S.
investors have claimed in a Mexican court proceeding that Mexico expropriated their
investment, they may not submit the same claim to arbitration under the NAFTA Chapter
11. Investors may not make use of both fora; taking "two bites of the apple" to gain relief is
not allowed. 42
In addition, decisions by the Canadian Government, following a review of a potential
acquisition under the Investment Canada Act, are not subject to the dispute settlement
37. Id., art. 105.
38. Id., art. 1119.
39. Id., art. 1120.
40. Id, art. 1121.
41. Id. Providing written consent and submitting the claim to arbitration satisfies the require-
ments of: (1) Chapter 11 of the ICSID Convention (Jurisdiction of the Centre) and the
Additional Facility Rules for written consent of the parties; (2) Article II of the New York
Convention for an agreement in writing; and, (3) Article I of the Inter-American Convention
for an agreement. Art. 1122.
42. The international law principle of lex mercatoria supports the argument that arbitration under
Chapter 11 is precluded when allegations of expropriation have been previously raised before
a Mexican court. In simple terms, lex mercatoria is defined as the system of laws adopted by
all commercial nations, which becomes part of common law. Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed.
1990) at 911. As discussed previously, the Parties expressly agreed that they "shall interpret
and apply the provisions of this Agreement ... in accordance with applicable rules of interna-
tional law. Id., art. 102(2).
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provisions of NAFTA Chapter 11 or Chapter 20. Decisions by Mexico's National
Commission on Foreign Investment, with respect to potential acquisitions in Mexico, are
similarly excluded from NAFTA's dispute settlement provisions.43
2. Structure of the Panel and the Proceedings.
In most cases, arbitration panels are to comprise three arbitrators - one appointed
by each of the disputing parties and the third, who will serve as the presiding arbitrator,
appointed by agreement of the disputing parties.44 If the parties fail to appoint the arbi-
trators, or fail to agree on a presiding arbitrator, the Secretary-General of ICSID shall
appoint any arbitrators not yet appointed.45 The Secretary-General will make appoint-
ments from a roster of 45 persons chosen by consensus of the NAFTA Parties. If no pre-
siding arbitrator is available from that roster, the Secretary-General will appoint from the
ICSID Panel of Arbitrators a presiding arbitrator who is not a national of any of the
Parties. The arbitration tribunal is to decide the issues in dispute in accordance with the
NAFTA and the applicable rules of international law.4 6
The dispute settlement mechanism also provides for the consolidation of claims. A
disputing party may request that the Secretary-General of ICSID establish a tribunal com-
prised of three arbitrators who shall determine, under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules,
whether claims submitted to arbitration have common questions of law or fact such that,
"in the interests of fair and efficient resolution of claims," the tribunal shall assume juris-
diction over, and hear and determine together, all or part of the claims. The tribunal may
also decide to assume jurisdiction over and decide one or more claims that it believes
would assist in the resolution of the others. 47
There may be a question as to whether Chapter 11, in conjunction with the relevant
international arbitration rules, would permit a disputing party to submit a counterclaim
for resolution in the course of the arbitration. Nothing in Chapter 11 appears expressly to
preclude a counterclaim by a Party against a disputing investor, and Article 1126(2) seems
to contemplate the consolidation of claims and counterclaims if they arise from the same
facts. Further, section 2 of Article 1120 states, "[t]he applicable arbitration rules shall gov-
ern the arbitration except to the extent modified by this Section' In a dispute involving
Mexico, Article 1120 of the NAFTA would thus incorporate either the Additional Facility
Rules of ICSID or the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, because Mexico is not a party to the
ICSID Convention. In turn, Article 48 of the Additional Facility Rules of ICSID and
Article 19, Section 3 of the UNCITRAL rules specifically allow for a respondent to make a
counterclaim if the counterclaim relates to the principal claim.
Another feature of the dispute settlement mechanism allows NAFTA Parties to make
submissions, similar to amicus curiae briefs, to an arbitration tribunal on a question of
interpretation of the NAFTA.48 Under this provision, the U.S. Government, for example,
43. NAFTA, supra note 1, annex 1138.2.
44. Id., art. 1123.
45. Id., art. 1124.
46. Id.,art. 1131.
47. Id., art. 1126.
48. Id., art. 1124.
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could make a submission to a tribunal hearing a dispute between the Government of
Mexico and U.S. investors. In addition, an arbitration panel may appoint experts to report
to it in writing on any factual issue concerning environmental, health, safety, or other sci-
entific matters raised by a disputing party in an arbitration proceeding. 49
3. Final Awards.
An arbitration tribunal deciding a Chapter 11 dispute may award monetary damages,
including applicable interest, and/or the restitution of property to the prevailing party.50
In the latter case, the disputing Party may pay monetary damages and any applicable inter-
est in lieu of restitution. 51 For arbitration claims made by an investor on behalf of an
enterprise, a final award of restitution of property must provide that restitution be made
to the enterprise and that an award of monetary damages be paid to the enterprise.52 For
any type of arbitration, the tribunal may award costs, but it may not order a Party to pay
punitive damages. 53
In the case of arbitrations conducted pursuant to the ICSID Rules, a party may
"appeal" the tribunal's finding by filing an application for annulment of the award with the
Secretary-General. Upon receipt of the application, the Secretary-General will request that
an ad hoc Committee of three persons (other than those who heard the original case) be
appointed from the Panel of Arbitrators.54 The Committee may annul part or all of an
award; in this event, either party may request the resubmission of the dispute to a new
arbitral tribunal. 55 The new tribunal may consider only those parts of an award that were
annulled by the ad hoc Committee. 56
Pursuant to the ICSID Additional Facility Arbitration Rules, parties may, within 45
days after the date of the award, request the arbitral tribunal to decide any question that
had been submitted to it but that was omitted from its original award.57 Parties may also
request, within 45 days of the award, the Secretary-General to obtain from the tribunal an
interpretation of the award.58
Under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, parties may, within 30 days after the receipt
of the award, request the arbitral tribunal to make an additional award as to claims pre-
sented in the arbitral proceedings but omitted from the award.59 If the arbitral tribunal
considers the request to be justified, it will complete its award within 60 days of receiving
the request. 60
49. NAFTA, supra note 1, Id., art. 1128.
50. Id., art. 1135(1).
51. Id., art. 1135(I)(b).
52. Id., art. 1135(2).
53. Id., art. 1135(3).
54. ICSID Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings, rule 52.
55. Id., rule 55.
56. Id., rule 55(3).
57. ICSID Additional Facility Arbitration Rules, art. 58.
58. ICSID Additional Facility Arbitration Rules, art. 56.
59. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art. 37(1).
60. Id., art. 37(2).
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Tribunal awards have binding force only between the disputing parties and with
respect to that particular case. 61 If a Party fails to abide by the terms of a final award, the
Party of the investor who prevailed in the arbitration may request the establishment of a
panel under Chapter 20 of the NAFTA. 62 This panel may determine that the former
Party's failure to comply with the terms of the final award is inconsistent with NAFTA
obligations and may recommend that Party comply with the terms of the award. Failure
to do so may trigger the right of the investor's Party to suspend benefits it provides pur-
suant to the NAFTA.
In the case of a final award made under the ICSID Convention, a disputing party may
not seek enforcement of a final award until 120 days have elapsed from the date of the
award and no party has requested revision or annulment of the award, or revision or
annulment proceedings have been completed. 63 In the case of a final award under the
ICSID Additional Facility Rules or the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, enforcement may
not be sought until three months have elapsed and no disputing party has commenced a
proceeding to revise, set aside or annul the award, or a court has dismissed or allowed an
application to revise, set aside or annul the award and there is no further appeal.64 Article
1136(4) requires each Party to provide for the enforcement of an award in its territory. In
addition, Article 1136 allows a disputing investor to seek enforcement of an arbitration
award under the New York Convention (United Nations Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958), which, in effect, allows the
investor to go to court to get the arbitration award enforced.
III. Hypothetical Investment Dispute Arising Under the NAFTA.
A. BASiC FACT SCENARIO.
Thinking about Chapter 11 in terms of a hypothetical investment dispute is useful in
understanding how the chapter is expected to function. Of the various types of invest-
ment disputes that might arise and make use of the dispute settlement mechanism of
Chapter 11, the hypothetical scenario we have developed concerns an investment in
Mexico by a group of U.S. investors. The type of investment contemplated is a concession.
The NAFTA defines a concession as "an authorization provided by the State to a per-
son to exploit a natural resource or provide a service, for which Mexican nationals and
Mexican enterprises are granted priority over foreigners." 65 Concession agreements typi-
61. Ild., art. 1136.
62. This arbitral panel shall be convened by the NAFTA Free Trade Commission, which was estab-
lished pursuant to Chapter 20 of the Agreement to, among other things, resolve disputes
regarding the interpretation of application of the NAFTA. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2001.
63. Id., art. 1136(3)(a).
64. Id., art. 1136(3)(b).
65. Id. annex 1-5, containing the only definition in the NAFTA of a concession. The particular loca-
tion of the definition may be explained by the fact that reservations relating to concessions
appear in Mexico's schedule to Annex I, but not in the schedules of the United States or Canada.
Given that the Mexican government has played and continues to play a larger role in owning or
controlling segments of that country's economy, compared with the other two NAFTA parties, it
seems logical that Mexico would be more involved in the awarding of concessions.
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cally authorize the provision of a public service, for consumption by the general public, in
return for agreed-upon compensation by a government entity. These contracts are not
regarded as government procurements but rather are classified as investments under the
NAFTA. 66
Also, while the fact pattern surrounding an equity investment in, or an acquisition of,
a private Mexican company, for example, would be different in certain ways from this
hypothetical, a dispute with the Mexican Government concerning those types of invest-
ments would similarly give rise to many of the basic issues that are discussed in this article.
1. Sequence of Events Surrounding the Hypothetical Investment Dispute.
The first stage, which actually occurs prior to the making of the investment, begins
when the Government of Mexico, or a state or local level government in Mexico, issues a
request for proposal or otherwise announces that an investment opportunity, via a conces-
sion agreement, is available. The concession might be for the provision of such services to
the local citizenry as computer outsourcing in the health industry, garbage collection or
recycling, or public construction and transportation.
Once the Mexican governmental entity (federal, state, county, or municipal-
-the "Entity") has granted the concession to the hypothetical U.S. investor group, the
appropriate contracts are signed. After being granted a concession for the provision of ser-
vices to the Entity's residents, the U.S. investors incorporate and capitalize a Mexican com-
pany to perform their obligations under the concession. The investors incur start-up
expenses, such as those related to hiring employees and paying their salaries, purchasing
equipment and supplies, and renting office space. The investors make initial capital invest-
ments in the company to which the concession was granted. The investors' Mexican enter-
prise will enter into contracts to procure the goods and services it needs to perform under
the concession. In addition, the U.S. investors must become informed about the provi-
sions of Mexican law that will affect the operation of their business. The investors will
have to concern themselves, for example, with applicable tax laws, labor laws, and import-
ing and other licensing requirements in Mexico, subject to any applicable protections in
the NAFTA. Taking initial steps such as these may be considered a sign of the company's
intent to perform under the concession.
Once the preparatory steps have been taken, the investors, acting through their
Mexican enterprise, begin to perform under the concession. The pace and breadth of the
services they provide under the concession may be subject to an agreed-upon phase-in
schedule. As the U.S. investors performance gets underway, the Entity becomes obligated
to compensate the company as provided under their concession agreement.
Let us assume now that some time after performance begins under the concession, the
hypothetical Mexican Entity elects new members to its governing body.67 Following its
66. As defined in Article 1139, the term "investment" includes "interests arising from the commit-
ment of capital or other resources in the territory of a Party to economic activity in such terri-
tory, such as under: (i) contracts involving the presence of an investor's property in the territo-
ry of the Party (including turnkey or construction contracts, or concessions)....'
67. Alternatively, of course, a shift in policy views may occur within the existing Entity govern-
ment, causing the members to reexamine any existing concession agreements.
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entry into power, the new Entity's government would assess the status of various conces-
sion agreements to which the Entity is a party. It determines that the U.S. investors in our
hypothetical are not in compliance with their concession contracts. The Entity's conclu-
sion that the U.S. investors are not performing as required may be based on their failure to
provide the specified services to Entity residents, a failure to make agreed-to capital invest-
ments in the company or otherwise in relation to the investment, or a failure to meet com-
mitments to bring Mexican investors into their enterprise. The new government might
also determine that the previous government entered into the agreement in some unau-
thorized manner or was duped into entering into it by fraudulent conduct or misrepresen-
tations made by the U.S. investors. The law of the Mexican Entity, may provide that any
government act done on the basis of mistake, error or bad faith may ]be voided by the gov-
ernment." The Entity may also point out that it has incurred expenses to provide the very
services the U.S. investors were supposed to, but failed to, provide under the concession.
In our hypothetical sequence of events, the Mexican Entity next gives notice of its
intent to nullify the concession, citing performance problems as its reason. The nullifica-
tion would likely be based, in part, on what the Entity considers an "emergency situation,'
where important services are not being provided to citizens because of the investors' non-
performance. The Entity then takes the legal actions necessary to nullify the concession. It
may be required to institute certain administrative procedures, such as issuing written alle-
gations and interrogatories to the U.S. investors for their response. The outcome of the
administrative proceeding may or may not support the Entity's decision to nullify the con-
cession. Depending on the circumstances, the Entity may shortly thereafter announce that
it has reopened the concession to competitive bidding to grant a concession to another
company to perform the same services.
Upon learning of the nullification, the U.S. investors may choose to dispute it by pro-
ceeding to litigation in a local court. The investors could seek the equivalent of a declara-
tory judgment that the nullification was improper because the Entity acted outside its
powers to nullify the concession or had "expropriated" their investment, allegedly in favor
of a local company. A court proceeding may result in a finding that the concession was
properly nullified and that the investors have failed to prove their allegation of wrongdo-
ing. The court may affirm the validity of the Entity's action and recognize the validity of
the nullification of the concession. On the other hand, the court may hold that the Entity
had an inadequate legal basis on which to nullify the concession.
As an alternative to proceeding in local courts, the U.S. investors may pursue arbitra-
tion under the dispute settlement mechanism of Chapter 11. In order to do so, the
investors must give the requisite notice of intent to submit a claim to arbitration and must
engage in a period of consultation and negotiation with Mexico. The dispute settlement
mechanism described above then comes into play.
B. KEY IssuEs THAT MAY ARISE
1. Expropriation.
The overriding issue, and the one on which an arbitration would likely be based, is
whether the Mexican Entity's nullification of the concession constituted an unlawful
68. See; e.g., State Code, Sec. 146.
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expropriation or was simply the Entity's commercially reasonable response to a breach of
contract by the U.S. investors. As indicated above, Chapter 11 was designed to address dis-
criminatory expropriations, including those that are politically motivated, but not ordinary
breach of contract disputes. The idea that the NAFTA's use of the term "expropriation" was
intended to reach ordinary breaches of contract would be directly contrary to conventional
international law, which as stated above, governs the interpretation of the treaty.6
9
Historically, a mere breach of contract is not considered redressable under international law.
Commercially motivated cancellations are controlled by municipal law unless the state's
actions discriminate or constitute a taking within the meaning of expropriation law.70
Traditionally, expropriation has been thought of as a state's unanticipated and arbi-
trary deprivation of rights unaccompanied by any invocation of legal rules or any justifica-
tion under a particular contractual clause. The decision to expropriate an investment is
typically rooted in shifts in government policy or political power. If, instead, an investor's
defaults in performance compel the government to abandon the contract, it becomes more
difficult to characterize the government's actions as expropriatory. The primary distinc-
tion between an expropriatory act and a commercial breach of contract, therefore, is the
"role" the government was in at the time of the allegedly expropriatory act: sovereign or
commercial participant. If the government was acting as a sovereign, the act is more likely
to be considered expropriatory.
Legal definitions of expropriation expressly assume the absence of any fault on the
part of or provocation by the investor. Section 238 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,
as amended in 1969 (the enabling statute for the Overseas Private Investment Corporation,
"OPIC"), for example, states that:
the term "expropriation" includes, but is not limited to, any abrogation,
repudiation, or impairment by a foreign government of its own contract with an
investor with respect to a project, where such abrogation, repudiation or impair-
ment is not caused by the investor's own fault or misconduct, and materially
adversely affects the continued operation of the project[.] 7 1
Many of the leading international law cases concerning expropriation have involved
concession agreements. In Kuwait v. American Independent Oil Co.,72 for example, an arbi-
tral tribunal examined whether a Kuwaiti government decree terminating American
Independent Oil Co.'s 1948 concession for the exploration and exploitation of petroleum
and natural gas constituted an unlawful taking of property interests.73 In Texaco Overseas
Petroleum Co. & California Asiatic Oil Co. (TOPCO) v. Government of the Libyan Arab
Republic,74 the sole arbitrator determined that Libya's 1974 nationalization of the property
69. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1131.
70. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 712, Comment (h)
(1986).
71. Foreign Assistance Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-175, § 238, 83 Stat 807 (1970). 22 U.S.C. §
2198.
72. 21 Int'l Leg. Mat. 976 (1982).
73. For a summary of this and other cases on expropriation, see Patrick M. Norton, A Law of the
Future or a Law of the Past? Modern Tribunals and the International Law of Expropriation, 85
AMER. J. INT'L L. 474,482 (1991).
74. 17 Int'l Leg. Mat. 1 (1978).
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rights held by Texaco and California Asiatic Oil Co. under numerous long-term concession
agreements was unlawful. The arbitrator ordered Libya to resume performance under
those agreements. 75
Not all terminations of concession agreements constitute a violation of international
law, as provided for by NAFTA Article 1110. International tribunals and legal commenta-
tors have recognized the right of a state to revoke a concession for non-fulfillment of the
alien investors' obligations thereunder, without running afoul of international law.76
Section 712 of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
(1986) treats separately expropriations and breaches of contract. A state is responsible
under international law for injury resulting from:
(2) a repudiation or a breach by the state of contract with a national of another state
(a) where the repudiation or breach is (i) discriminatory; or (ii) motivated by non-
commercial considerations, and compensatory damages are not paid; or
(b) where the foreign national is not given an adequate forum to determine his claim
of repudiation or breach, or is not compensated for any repudiation or breach determined
to have occurred....
Whether the Entity's termination of the concession in our hypothetical investment
dispute violates the NAFTA and international principles of expropriation will depend
greatly on whether the Entity was motivated primarily by political or commercial consid-
erations. According to comment (h) to § 712 of the Restatement (Third), a state's repudia-
tion is not a violation of the international law of expropriation if it is based on a "bona fide
dispute" about the parties' obligations or performance. Reporter's Note 8 to § 712 further
states that "international law is not implicated if a state repudiates or breaches a commer-
cial contract with a foreign national for commercial reasons as a private contractor might,
e.g., ... because of controversy about the contractor's performance.' Pursuant to the
Restatement, therefore, the Mexican Entity's nullification of a concession would not violate
international law if its action was based on legitimate concerns regarding the investors'
performance, and if the investors were given a fair opportunity to contest the Entity's
assertions. A government is not required by international law to stay wedded to a default-
ing contractor.
The fact that a government has a colorable claim that the investors breached their
obligations under the concession, however, is not dispositive on the issue of expropriation.
In Liberian Eastern Timber Corp. (LETCO) v. The Government of the Republic of Liberia, for
example, the Liberian government asserted a series of breaches by LETCO of its obliga-
tions under a concession agreement for the processing of forest products. 77 Nevertheless,
the arbitration tribunal determined that the allegations were not supported by the evi-
75. Under the NAFTA, an arbitral tribunal may award, separately or in combination, monetary
damages, with any applicable interest, and restitution of property. NAFTA, Supra note 1, art.
1135(1). If restitution of property is awarded, the award must provide, however, that the dis-
puting Party may pay monetary damages with any applicable interest in lieu of restitution.
NAFTA, Supra note 1, art. 1135(1)(b).
76. See, e.g., Libyan American Oil Co. (LIAMCO) v. The Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, 20
Int'l Leg. Mat. 1 (1982). See also Mann, State Contracts and State Responsibility, 54 AM. J. INT'L
LAw 572, 574-75 (1960) (where state raises a genuine dispute as to its legal obligations under the
contract, the state's"breach of contract" is unlikely to give rise to a claim in international law).
77. 26 Int'l Leg. Mat. 647 (1987).
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dence, that Liberia had not given LETCO proper notice of any alleged breaches pursuant
to the terms of the contract, and that Liberia, therefore, was responsible for damages
caused by its improper revocation of the concession. Similarly, in Valentine Petroleum &-
Chem. Corp. v. AID, an arbitral panel found that an unlawful expropriation had occurred,
regardless of the Haitian Government's arguments that a dispute existed as to the date of
expected performance. 78 Thus, arbitral tribunals are willing to look at the underlying facts
of a dispute to determine if they support government assertions that the cancellation of a
concession was caused and justified by the investor's breach of performance obligations.
Further, statements issued by a government may be a pretext for an underlying arbitrary
motive. Tribunals scrutinize whether the government was acting within, or outside, its role
as a commercial participant. If the authority the government relied upon to void a conces-
sion was its inherent power to act in the public interest, the action is more likely to be con-
sidered expropriatory. If, on the other hand, the government raised serious performance
issues that any private contracting party legitimately would be concerned about, the argu-
ment will be stronger that the cancellation - whether or not justified under municipal
law - is not expropriatory under international law principles. Such principles become
operative only if there is a denial of justice or some arbitrary or discriminatory element in
the state's conduct. Therefore, for a claim to be meritorious under the NAFTA, the
investors must show, at a minimum, discriminatory or arbitrary actions by the NAFTA
government.
As stated above, arbitration tribunals look to circumstantial evidence in determining
whether the government's cancellation was politically, and therefore likely discriminatorily,
motivated. Judging from past cases, it can be difficult to predict how a decision-maker will
rule on the issue of a party's intent. Several key factors in the analysis can be identified,
however, from previous agency and arbitral panel decisions.
The subsequent, immediate award of the concession to a government insider, for
example, has been cited in support of a finding of expropriatory intent In Georgia
Pacific International, Ecuador cancelled a concession and immediately granted it to a
third party who was the nephew of the president of Ecuador.79 The government's
protests that the foreign investor had not met the deadline by which a mill facility was
to be constructed were rejected because the evidence showed that the investor had
been denied possession of the site.
The presence of unusually harsh business conditions has also been cited as an indica-
tion of political motivation.80 The decision to avoid a concession is likely to be ruled
an expropriation if the cancellation is accompanied by aggravating circumstances
such as harassment. In the case of Fearn International, Inc., for example, the
Government of Somalia had arrested key employees and blocked access to the plant
site.81 The government's appointment of an intervenor may also be considered a
78. Award dated Sept. 15, 1967, reprinted in 9 Int'l Leg. Mat. 889 (1970).
79. Contract No. 6293, Action Memorandum (OPIC Aug. 2, 1973).
80. See, e.g., Agricola Metals Corp., Contract No. 8636, Memorandum of Determination (OPIC
May 3, 1979) (expropriation found even though government had colorable claim of investor
breach).
81. Contract Nos. 5969 and 6159, Memorandum of Determination at 3 (OPIC Oct. 20, 1973).
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form of harassment that suggests expropriatory action. In Northern Indiana Brass Co.,
OPIC found that the government's reliance on a company's failure to obtain govern-
ment approval for a shutdown was merely a pretext and that an intervenor had been
appointed to force the American company into bankruptcy.8 2
While it is no longer necessary to show that a decision to terminate a concession was
made in the midst of political upheaval, it may still be relevant that a new regime,
announcing new economic policies, has come into power since the concession was
awarded. The facts surrounding the arbitration of Revere Copper and Brass, Inc and
Overseas Private Investment Corp., for example, involved a newly elected Jamaican
Prime Minister who had announced an economic policy that included national eco-
nomic primacy in the aluminum and bauxite industries. At the same time, the new
Prime Minister had passed additional taxes in violation of the stabilization clause of
the investment agreement.8 3 In awarding Revere Copper and Brass, Inc. compensa-
tion under its contract with OPIC, the arbitral panel found that the actions of the new
Jamaican government had "effectively put an end" to the investment agreement and
had directly prevented the company from "exercising effective control over the use or
disposition of its property."
Even if an arbitral tribunal rejects the government's arguments that the investor's
defaults justified an avoidance of the concession, the government may be successful in
asserting that at worst, it is guilty of a repudiation or breach of a contract, which should
not be scrutinized under international law principles. In International Fisheries Co.
(U.S.A.) v. United Mexican States, for example, the United States-Mexican Claims
Commission addressed the issue of whether the "Calvo Clause" of a concession agreement
precluded an investigation of a claim arising from the cancellation of that agreement. 84 As
indicated above, under the Calvo doctrine as it operated prior to the passage of the
NAFTA, Mexico maintained that foreign investors should have the same recourse as
Mexican nationals in settling disputes: Disputes were to be determined in local Mexican
courts under local law. In upholding the Calvo clause and ruling that the claim could not
properly be brought before it, the Commission noted that the cancellation in question
"was not an arbitrary act, a violation of a duty abhorrent to the contract and which in
itself might be considered as a violation of some rule or principle of international law."
The Commission asserted that such conditions must be present for it to examine a claim
on the basis of international law, even in the absence of a Calvo clause. Annulments of a
contract done in accordance with the contract's express terms do not give rise to a claim
for settlement under international law.85 The Commission conduded,"[I]f every non-ful-
fillrent of a contract on the part of a government were to create at once the presumption
of an arbitrary act, which should therefore be avoided, governments would be in a worse
situation than that of any private person, a party to any contract."86
82. Contract No. 6360, Action Memorandum (OPIC Jan. 22, 1973).
83. 14 Int'l Leg. Mat. 1321 (1978).
84. 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 691 (1931).
85. Id. at 699.
86. Id. at 700.
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a. The Government's Perspective.
Returning now to our hypothetical, we can examine the arguments that the Mexican
government might provide with respect to why its actions nullifying the concession do not
constitute an unlawful expropriation. In whatever forum - a local court or administra-
tive body or an international arbitration pursuant to NAFTA Chapter 11 - in which the
investors lodge their protest, the Mexican government is likely to justify its actions with
one of two principal arguments: The government was justified in voiding the concession
on contractual grounds because the investors lacked the technical or financial capacity to
perform under the agreement and were in fact not meeting their performance obligations,
or because the concession agreement was procured by mistake, error, or bad faith.
That the investors have failed to perform under the contract provides perhaps the
most sound basis for nullifying the concession because, as illustrated in international case
law, governments are allowed to make decisions on contractual grounds and are allowed to
act as reasonable commercial participants in the marketplace. A government's nullifica-
tion of a contract on purely commercial grounds, because of a breach of performance
obligations by the other party, is unlikely to be considered expropriatory. To protect itself
from allegations of expropriation, therefore, it is crucially important that the government
have solid commercial reasons for repudiating a concession and not appear by its actions
to be favoring domestic investors.
A wide range of performance issues might arise that cause the Mexican Entity to con-
dude that the U.S. investors lacked the ability or the willingness to perform under the con-
cession agreement. The investors might fall behind on the agreed-upon production sched-
ule or the schedule for the delivery of certain services. They may fail to use the materials or
implement the technology agreed to in the concession. The services they do provide may
not be up to expected standards as set forth in the agreement The failure to deliver the
agreed-upon goods or services, of the expected quality and by the expected time, would
likely constitute a breach of the investors' performance obligations under the concession.
Because the investors chosen to provide a particular service to the public under a conces-
sion are typically taking the place of the government, which many times has provided the
service in the past, ensuring that the service is provided in a timely manner and meets cer-
tain standards is very important to the government Making sure that the investors perform
under the concession is necessary to avoid potentially massive public outcry and discontent,
particularly when the concession pertains to such vital and visible public services as, for
example, water purification, highway construction or garbage collection.
The U.S. investors might also breach their performance obligations by failing to make
promised capital investments in the Mexican company formed to perform under the con-
cession. The concession agreement might include corollary investment obligations on the
U.S. investors, such as to make investments in people - by committing to hire a certain
number of people or to pay for training and education for workers - or in infrastructure
or other resources - by committing to clean up and protect certain water sources from
pollution by the investors' manufacturing or to build a waste processing facility in con-
junction with the investors' operations, for example. In some cases, the investors' failure to
adequately capitalize the project may cause the Entity government to incur expenses to
provide the services that should, under the concession, be provided by the U.S. investors.
The investors' failure to adequately capitalize their venture could place in financial jeop-
ardy the Mexican and other creditors of the company formed by the investors pursuant to
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the concession. The decision to award a concession is based in part on the investors' com-
mitment to capitalize the project at a certain level and is based on the government's analy-
sis of the investments financial strength and feasibility. Under most circumstances, the
failure to meet such capitalization commitments, therefore, constitutes a breach of the
concession by the investors.
The government's nullification of the concession might also be based on commercial
grounds of another sort. The Entity may claim that the contract between it and the investors
was entered into improperly through the fault of the investors. The government may argue
that, under general contract law, an agreement entered into because of fraud or misrepresen-
tation by one party may be voided, and it is not binding on the innocent party, a fraud in the
inducement type of theory. The government may discover that dishonest or misleading rep-
resentations by the investors, particularly as to their capability and capacity to perform, con-
vinced the government to award the concession to that party. Fraudulent misrepresentations
as to the identity of the investors may also provide a commercial basis for voiding the conces-
sion. The possibility also exists that acts of bribery led to the granting of the concession. A
subsequent government administration may "justify" its nullification of the concession by
reference to the underhanded or illegal means by which it was obtained. However, termina-
tion of this concession by the new government may still be regarded as an unlawful expropri-
ation, even if the concession were obtained by illegal means. 87
In the event that the government's nullification of a concession is challenged, the gov-
ernment's position will be strengthened if the government can show evidence of its intent
to reestablish a concession with some other private investor or investor group, such as by
reopening the concession for public bidding. If, on the other hand, the government
resumes provision of the service itself or awards the concession to a predetermined private
party, a finding of expropriation would be more likely.88 The Mexican Government
should be sure that it follows the proper local procedures and rules in nullifying the con-
cession and that it provides the investors with an adequate forum to adjudicate the claims
they may bring with respect to their investment. Taking these actions will lessen the likeli-
hood that the government's nullification of the concession will be deemed expropriatory.
87. Previous bad acts by the government, such as accepting or inducing bribes, do not necessarily
exonerate subsequent administrations, whose behavior is held to the standards required under
trade agreements and under international law in general. As a general rule under the law of
contracts, a party with "unclean hands" may not be released unilaterally from its contract
obligations to the detriment of the other party for reasons related to its own wrongdoing.
McKechnie v. McDermott, 595 F. Supp. 672, 676 (N.D. Ind. 1984) ("A plaintiff cannot seek relief
against the wrong of another where he himself was engaged in the same wrong or a wrong
with reference to the same matter."); Assoc. Business Telephone Systems Corp. v. Greater Capital
Corp., 729 F. Supp. 1488 (D. N.J. 1990) (holding that the doctrine of unclean hands is not lim-
ited to suits in equity and is equally applicable to damage actions.). This rule would apply
even where the individuals directly responsible for the wrongdoing have been replaced by new
government representatives.
88. See, e.g., Georgia Pacific International, supra note 80.
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b. The Investors' Perspective.
Investors who allege that their investment under a concession agreement has been
unlawfully expropriated are likely to argue that the government's allegations of defects in
the investors' performance are a mere pretext designed to disguise an expropriatory intent.
They may argue that the Mexican Government's intent is in fact expropriatory even if some
plausible claim can be made that the investor was in technical breach of the concession. As
illustrated by several of the cases cited above, an unlawful expropriation dearly can be, and
has been, found despite the availability of technical grounds to terminate the concession.8 9
The critical consideration in such instances appears to be whether the concession was can-
celled due to political, as opposed to commercial, considerations. If pronouncements by the
government, for example, suggest a policy or an overall strategy that would be furthered by
cancellation of the concession, the termination is likely to be viewed as expropriatory
despite the presence of some evidence that the investor may have been in technical default.
To back up their allegations that the government had an underlying political motive,
the U.S. investors may argue that the concession agreement was too new - had been
implemented too recently - for judgments to be made about the investors' performance.
They may claim that the Mexican Government's "premature" decision to declare the
investors incapable of performing and in breach of their performance obligations indicates
that the government had no desire to see the investment succeed. They may also claim
that the government interfered with their ability to perform and thereby caused the
investors to default.
In the alternative, the investors may argue that the nullification of the concession con-
stitutes an unlawful expropriation because the government denied the investors an ade-
quate forum to determine whether the government's action was expropriatory.90 The
investors may assert that they were not given adequate notice of the alleged deficiencies in
their performance or time to prepare for or present their side in an administrative or court
proceeding. They might claim they were denied access to documents crucial to their
appearance at that proceeding. The investors might also cite to any failure by the govern-
ment to comply with termination provisions in the concession agreement as evidence of
the government's haste in nullifying the concession and as evidence of its expropriatory
intent. Finally, if the government attempts to support its nullification by pointing to mere
technical irregularities in its granting of the concession, the investors may use that attempt
as evidence of expropriatory intent, arguing that any irregularities in the contract's lan-
guage or execution are equally the fault of the government and could be grounds for refor-
mation, but not for nullification, of the concession.
In sum, in order to prevail on a claim that the government's nullification of a conces-
sion was expropriatory, in either a local administrative or court proceeding or in an inter-
national arbitration, the investors must show that (1) the government's action was dis-
criminatory in nature or was motivated by non-commercial considerations, and compen-
satory damages were not paid, or (2) the government failed to provide an adequate forum
to determine the claim for repudiation or breach or failed to provide adequate notice, and
compensatory damages were not paid.
89. See, e.g., Agricola Metals Corp., supra note 81.
90. Restatement (Third), 712 (2)(b) supra note 71.
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2. Damages.
The issue of what damages the investors might claim or be entitled to will be a major
component of nearly every investment dispute under the NAFTA. The parties' ability to
agree on the measure and amount of any damages to be paid will be a critical factor in
determining whether the dispute ever reaches the arbitration stage or is instead resolved in
settlement. Thus, while the issue of damages will almost always have to be resolved before
the dispute can be settled, it is possible that the question of whether an unlawful expropri-
ation in fact occurred may never be formally determined in a given dispute.
Just as in domestic litigation, it can be anticipated that the measure of damages relied
up on by the investors will differ from that used by the NAFTA Party. Although Chapter
11 contains its own specific provision regarding the compensation to be paid for an unlaw-
ful expropriation, it borrows heavily from U.S. and international legal standards for calcu-
lating damages. Understanding how wronged investors are intended to be compensated
under Chapter 11 thus requires an understanding of how these standards and measures
have been applied in the past.
Over the years, international tribunals and commentators have offered different for-
mulations for the compensation standard that should be used in cases of expropriation. 9 1
In the large majority of cases, economic damages constitute the compensation awarded to
investors or property owners who have suffered an unlawful expropriation of their proper-
ty rights. 9 2 The primary source of debate in international law has been whether the expro-
priating state is required to give "full compensation" for the property owner's loss or
whether the state may employ a standard allowing less than full compensation, such as
"appropriate" or "equitable" compensation. Gann's study of international tribunal deci-
sions, conducted in the mid-1980s, illustrates the variety of standards that have been
adopted by international arbitrators, including those providing "appropriate," "equitable,'
and "fair" compensation. 93
In real-life terms, these standards will be incorporated into damage claims that take
several forms. In attempting to settle our hypothetical investment dispute, for example,
the investors are likely to put one or both of the following demands on the table: (1) that
the concession agreement be reinstated and the investors be compensated for economic
damages for the period since the agreement was nullified; or, (2) that the parties agree to
terminate their relationship, and the investors receive fair market value for their interests
under the concession agreement. Under this second settlement option, the investors' claim
for damages will most likely be calculated to include compensation for (1) capital expendi-
91. Restatement (Third) § 712, Reporter's Note 2, supra note 71. For detailed discussions of the
international law standards that have been used to determine the compensation owed to own-
ers of property expropriated by foreign governments, see e.g., Patrick Norton, A Law of the
Future or a Law of the Past? Modern Tribunals and the International Law of Expropriation, 85
AM. J. INT'L L. 474 (1991); Pamela Gann, Compensation Standardfor Expropriation, 23 CoLuM.
J. INT'L L. 615 (1985).
92. A rare exception can be found in Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. v. Libya, supra note 75, where
the arbitrator ordered Libya to resume performance under its concession agreement with
TOPCO. Notwithstanding the Texaco decision, the remedies of restitution of property rights
or specific performance have been awarded only very rarely in the second half of this century.
93. See Gann, supra note 92 at 648-49.
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tures and investments, (2) out-of-pocket expenses, and (3) lost profits. Out-of-pocket
expenses, including legal counsel and consultants' fees, obviously require solid proof of
these expenses. The investors should be required to substantiate their claimed expenses
with adequate documentation. Lost profits can be even more difficult to estimate and can
be a more serious source of contention between the parties that are attempting to settle the
dispute. This issue of lost profits is discussed more fully below.
a. Compensation Standard under NAFTA Chapter 11.
The standard that has been incorporated into the investment chapter of the NAFTA
requires the payment of"fair market value.' Article 1110(2) states the relevant standard:
Compensation shall be equivalent to the fair market value of the expropriated investment
immediately before the expropriation took place ("date of expropriation"), and shall not
reflect any change in value occurring because the intended expropriation had become
known earlier. Valuation criteria shall include going concern value, asset value including
declared tax value of tangible property, and other criteria, as appropriate, to determine fair
market value.
Despite the seeming clarity of this standard, prior international case law remains rele-
vant to an investment dispute under the NAFTA to the extent it provides guidance as to
the interpretation or application of the meaning of "fair market value. ' 94 Furthermore,
several international decisions are helpful in their discussion and application of "going
concern value" and "asset value" as criteria for determining the fair market value of expro-
priated property.
Particularly helpful for this analysis is the line of cases that was determined by the
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal (the "Tribunal"). The Tribunal was established in the wake of
the Iranian Islamic revolution of 1979 to adjudicate disputes concerning, inter alia, the
nationalization of various American-owned assets and businesses in Iran. The Tribunal's
awards generally were based upon the compensation standard set forth in the U.S.-Iran
Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights (the "Treaty of Amity"), which
provided for compensation that represented the "full equivalent of the property taken.' 95
b. Fair Market Value.
In determining fair market value, international tribunals have generally first examined
whether there existed an established market price for the expropriated property. In Amer.
Int'l Group, Inc. v. Iran,96 for example, the Tribunal indicated that the claimant's compen-
sation should equal the fair market value of the expropriated property, which consisted of
shares in an Iranian corporation. The Tribunal indicated that such value should be deter-
mined according to the actual market price of such shares, but because no active market
existed, the Tribunal determined their market value by estimating the value of the compa-
ny as a going concern, including such factors as future business prospects and goodwill.
Similarly, in LN.A. Corporation v. Iran,97 the Tribunal determined that the best evidence of
94. NAFTA, supra note, arts. 102(2), 1131(1).
95. See Aug. 15, 1955,8 UST 900, TIAS No. 3853, 284 UNTS 93.
96. 4 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 96 (1983).
97. 8 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 373 (1985).
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the fair market value of the claimant's 20% holding in an Iranian company was the actual
price that the claimant had paid for its shares one year prior to the nationalization of the
company. The Tribunal defined "fair market value" as "the amount which a willing buyer
would have paid a willing seller for the shares of a going concern, disregarding any
diminution of value due to the nationalisation itself or the anticipation thereof, and
excluding consideration of events thereafter that might have increased or decreased the
value of the shares' 9 8
Fair market valuations can be made according to different accounting methodologies,
including an income approach (discounted cash flow), which considers the expected earn-
ings and future cash flows of the business entity. Valuation analyses may be conducted to
produce a range of fair market values for the concession agreement, which are designed for
use in settlement negotiations. It is important for the parties to the dispute to agree upon a
valuation date from which calculations can be made. Valuation analyses will look at such
factors as: (I) performance estimates; (2) risk factors, which could affect the investors' abili-
ty to perform; (3) analysis of other service providers in the industry, as a basis of compari-
son; and, (4) assumptions underlying the investors' budget estimates. The investors should
be expected to be able to substantiate the customer totals, sales volume, and growth expec-
tations with which they establish their expected earnings figures. Expense calculations
should consider depreciation, profit sharing, income tax rates, and capital expenditures.
To arrive at a damage figure, the expenses the investors saved from not performing
should be deducted from the expected gross revenue so that what is claimed is lost profit,
not lost revenue. The Mexican Government will likely object to compensation claims
from investors if, for a multi-phase concession arrangement that was nullified in its early
stages, the calculations assume that all investments required over the life of the agreement
have been made and that the company is operating at full capacity. If the investors do not
have the assets and working capital completely in place, with its work force established and
its business operating on a going concern basis, the Mexican Government should oppose
demands to pay the investors the same amount it might to a fully operational, going con-
cern business. The government will assert that lost profits should not be awarded for
phases of the investment that the investors have shown no ability to perform. Any profit
that the investors claim they would have made from some future activity they had not yet
begun or shown the ability to do would arguably be wholly speculative. 99
c. Another standard: Just Compensation under the Restatement.
Section 712 of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States (entitled, "State Responsibility for Economic Injury to Nationals of Other States")
employs the standard of "just compensation" for victims of expropriation. The Section pro7
vides that "[f]or compensation to be just.. ., it must, in the absence of exceptional circum-
98. Id.
99. For a discussion of this principle as set forth in common law, see, e.g., National Controls v.
National Semiconductor, 833 F. 2d 491,495 (3rd Cir. 1987); Deauville Corp. v. Federated Dept.
Stores, Inc., 756 F. 2d 1183, 1194 n. 8 (5th Cir. 1985).
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stances, be in an amount equivalent to the value of the property taken and be paid at the time
of taking, or within a reasonable time thereafter with interest from the date of taking, and in a
form economically usable by the foreign national..." Comment (d) to § 712 explains that,
where it can be determined, the compensation to be paid should equal the fair market value
of the expropriated property, taking into account any going concern value that exists.10°
Reporter's Note 3 to § 712 states that, in instances where the expropriated property is unique
and it is thus difficult to calculate a market value, it may also be acceptable to capture going
concern value by calculating the present value of the future earnings of the investment As
under U.S. domestic law, the Restatement provides that if compensation is delayed pending
administrative, judicial, or legislative processes for establishing the appropriate compensation,
interest must be paid from the time the taking occurred. In addition, the compensation
should be paid in a freely convertible currency with no restriction on its repatriation.
According to Reporter's Note 2, payments meeting this obligation indude deferred payments,
such as bonds, as long as they bear interest that is "realistically related to market rates."
According to Reporters' Note 2 to § 712, "The Executive Branch and the Congress of
the United States have held resolutely to the view that international law requires compen-
sation that is 'prompt, adequate and effective."' This formula was first asserted by
Secretary of State Hull in 1938. The same standard has been incorporated into various
aspects of domestic law. Under 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(4), for example, the United States may
deny the benefits of the generalized system of tariff preferences for least-developed coun-
tries that expropriate property and fail to compensate in accordance with this standard.
Professor Gann concludes in her study that, although international tribunals have not typ-
ically employed the precise wording of the "prompt, adequate, and effective" compensation
standard favored by the United States, the valuation methods that have been used have
often been very consistent with this standard. 1 1
On the other hand, Latin American countries, including Mexico, have traditionally
asserted that "appropriate compensation" was provided for expropriation as long as aliens
were compensated to the same extent as their nationals would be. 102
100. Restatement (third) §712 comment(d), supra note 71. Comment (d) to § 712 of the
Restatement provides that in exceptional circumstances, such as war, parties may be justified
in deviating from the "just compensation" standard. Comment (d) also states, however, that
.a departure from the general rule on the ground of such exceptional circumstances is unwar-
ranted if (i) the property taken had been used in a business enterprise that was specifically
authorized or encouraged by the state..."
101. Gann, supra note 92 at 649-50.
102. Restatement (Third) § 712, Reporter's Note 2 supra note 71. It is interesting to note that The
United Nations Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States employs the standard of "appro-
priate" compensation, to be paid according to the laws of the expropriating state, not pursuant to
international law standards for compensation. The relevant part of Chapter 2, Art. II of this reso-
lution states that each State has the right to "...nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of
foreign property, in which case appropriate compensation should be paid by the State adopting
such measures, taking into account its relevant laws and regulations and all circumstance that the
State considers pertinent' G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 50, U.N. Doc.
A/9631 (1974), reprinted in 14 Int'l Leg. Mat. 251, 255 (1975). Most Western states, however, have
not embraced, or have in fact outwardly rejected, the Charter. Gann's analysis of international tri-
bunal awards showed that, up to the time of her study, no international tribunal had yet adopted
the Charter's viewpoint that the expropriating state has the right to apply its own laws in deter-
mining the appropriate amount of compensation to be paid. (Gann, supra note 92 at 648-49.)
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d. Going Concern Value.
As seen above, in some cases there is little or no evidence of an actual market price of
the expropriated property. The fair market value must then be determined by the use of
other criteria, including the "going concern value" of the asset. In evaluating the "going
concern value" to determine the compensation due, international tribunals have attempted
to calculate the prospective profits of the enterprise in question. One author has described
the going concern approach as one that "attempts to measure earnings power (and so
encompasses elements such as loss of future profits which may be based on projections of
past earnings or estimates of future earnings)" 10 3 In American Int'l Group, for example,
the Tribunal evaluated the expropriated corporation as a going concern and stated that
"the most important element of the compensation claimed by the Claimants... is the loss
of prospective earnings" 01 °4 In another case, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Iran,105 the Tribunal
determined the compensation due Phillips for Iran's repudiation of an oil concession
agreement. 106 After determining that Phillips' enterprise should be evaluated as a going
concern, the Tribunal estimated the profits Phillips would have earned during the duration
of the concession, discounting such amounts to the date of expropriation, and awarded the
company $55 million for Iran's breach. 107
e. Circumstances in which Lost Profits are not Recoverable.
International tribunals and scholars have recognized however, that, under some cir-
cumstances, recovery of lost profits may be inappropriate. In some situations, lost profits
are not recoverable because they are too speculative to be fairly estimated. In Phelps Dodge
Corp. and OPIC and Iran,10 8 for example, claimants sought damages for the nationaliza-
tion of an ownership interest in an Iranian company, SICAB, which was established for the
purpose of manufacturing wire and cable products. However, before SICAB completed
103. Smith, The U.S. Government Perspective on Expropriation and Investment in Developing
Countries, 9 VAND. J. INT'L L. 517, 519-52 (1976).
104. American Int'l Group, supra note 97, at 107.
105. 21 Iran - U.S. C.T.R. 79 (1989).
106. In the majority of international law cases applying the going concern approach, the property
expropriated was an ownership interest in an ongoing business. In some cases, however, the
issue has arisen as to whether the investor's contractual rights may be evaluated as a going
concern. The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal decided this issue in the Phillips Petroleum case, con-
cluding that Phillips' contractual rights were part of a going concern and that Phillips was
entitled to be compensated for the fair market value of those rights. Id. at 119.
107. See also AMCO Asia Corporation et al. and Indonesia, 24 Int'l Leg. Mat. 1022, 1037 (1984) (an
ICSID arbitral tribunal awarded compensation by valuing the investment as a going concern,
for which it established the "netpresent value of the business, based on a reasonable projection
of the foreseeable net cash flow during the period to be considered, said net cash flow being
then discounted in order to take into account the assessment of the damages at the date of the
prejudice....").
108. 25 Int'l Leg. Mat. 619 (1986).
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construction of its manufacturing facilities, the Iranian revolution forced the departure of
American personnel, and the Iranian government subsequently assumed control of the
facilities. Phelps Dodge Corp. participated in arbitration before the Tribunal and sought
recovery of its prospective earnings based upon a valuation of SICAB as a going concern.
In evaluating the fair market value of the company as of the date of expropriation, the
Tribunal determined that the company had not yet become a going concern and that any
conclusions as to SICAB's goodwill or future profits were "highly speculative."
Accordingly, the Tribunal refused to estimate such earnings, and it awarded SICAB an
amount equal to the claimant's actual investment in the Company.
A similar result was reached by the Tribunal in Sola Tiles, Inc. v. Iran,109 which also
involved the nationalization of an American-owned corporation. After determining the
fair market value of the company's tangible assets, including physical property, accounts
receivable and expropriated cash, the Tribunal declined to award compensation for lost
goodwill or future profits. The Tribunal questioned the value of Sola Tile's goodwill in
light of the changes in the Iranian political and economic environment. Further, the
Tribunal found that the company's brief operating history, during which it operated at a
loss in its first year and showed only a small profit the following year, provided an insuffi-
dent basis upon which to award future profits.
The United States Department of State has also acknowledged that application of the
going concern approach may be impracticable or unfair in situations where expropriation
occurs before the investment has begun to generate revenue.110 In general, the three stan-
dards recognized by the State Department as indirect methods of approximating the fair
market value of expropriated property are (1) going concern value, (2) replacement cost,
and (3) book value. 111 The going concern approach, which measures earnings power
based on past earnings or estimates of future earnings, has been regarded by the State
Department as generally providing the best approximation of fair market value (although,
as just stated, inappropriate in some circumstances). The second method calculates the
replacement cost of the property at the time it was expropriated, less actual depredation.
This calculation does not consider earning capacity. The book value approach values the
investors' assets at their acquisition cost, less depreciation. This approach is not regarded
as favorably as the other two because it is thought to yield figures that have little relation-
ship to the actual value of the expropriated property. 11 2 As an overarching rule, the State
Department policy regarding valuation methods has recognized that the method most
likely to provide just compensation depends on the particular circumstances of the invest-
ment at issue, as well as on non-monetary aspect of the settlement that may be negotiated
between the parties. 113
Accordingly, if, as in our hypothetical investment scenario, the investors have been
performing (or under the obligation to perform) under the concession agreement for only
a short period of time with no track record of operations or profits, an arbitral tribunal
109. 14 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 223 (1987).
110. See Smith, supra note 104 at 519 (stating that, where an investment has a limited history of
operating results or expropriation occurs before a revenue-generating stage is reached, the
going concern approach may not operate fairly).
111. Id. at 519.
112. I4
113. Id.
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may find it improper to evaluate the concession as a going concern. Clearly, the NAFTA
itself allows compensation for the consideration of an investment's going concern value.
Article 111 O's endorsement of the going concern approach indicates that an investor's lost
profits may be recoverable in the event of an expropriation of property in violation of the
NAFTA Agreement. The body of international law that may be consulted to interpret the
meaning of the NAFTA standard, however, shows that evaluation of an investment as a
going concern and calculation of its potential lost profits are not appropriate to all situa-
tions. Faced with a situation like the one described in our hypothetical, the Mexican
Government would want to argue that the investment had not yet become a going concern
when the concession was terminated and that there was no operating history upon which
to estimate future earnings. The investors might tend to counter that, although the partic-
ular Mexican venture did not yet have a track record of profits, that was the fault of the
Mexican parties in terminating the concession. Moreover, the investors might show that
other businesses in which they are involved have been successful, so as to establish their
own track record and credibility.114
3. Annex 1120.1: No two bites of the apple.
A third issue that is likely to arise in our hypothetical and in a number of investment
disputes involving Mexico relates to the forum in which the investors choose to bring their
claim against the Mexican government. Annex 1120.1 of the NAFTA provides that an
investor of another Party may not allege that Mexico has breached an obligation under
NAFTA Chapter 11 (e.g., by expropriating an investment) both in a NAFTA arbitration
and in proceedings before a Mexican court or administrative tribunal. 115 U.S. or
Canadian investors must choose one forum or the other, therefore, because once allega-
tions of expropriation or any other violation of Chapter 11 have been made in one forum,
access to the other is denied. This restriction applies solely to allegations made in Mexican
court or administrative proceedings. NAFTA investors in Canada or the United States are
not similarly restricted by Annex 1120.1. This annex precludes NAFTA investors in
Mexico from, in effect, taking "two bites of the same apple.' Interpreted according to its
plain meaning, the Annex prohibits investors from first bringing a claim before a Mexican
court or administrative body and later, especially if they are unhappy with the judicial or
administrative determination, bringing the same claim before an arbitral panel pursuant
114. Cf. McDermortv. Middle East Carpet Co. Associated, 811 F. 2d 1422,1427-28 (llthCir. 1987).
115. NAFTA supra note 1, annex 1120.1 provides as follows: With respect to the submission of a
claim to arbitration: (a) a provision of subChapter A (1) An investor of another Party may not
allege that Mexico has breached: (i) Section A [of Chapter 11] or Article 1503(2) (State
Enterprises), or (ii) Article 1502(3)(a) (Monopolies and State Enterprises) where the monop-
oly has acted in a manner inconsistent with the Party's obligations under Section A [Chapter
111, both in an arbitration under this subchapter and in proceedings before a Mexican court
or administrative tribunal; and (b) where an enterprise of Mexico that is a juridical person
that an investor of another Party owns or controls directly or indirectly alleges in proceedings
before a Mexican court or administrative tribunal that Mexico has breached an obligation
under: (i) Section A [Chapter 11] or Article 1503(2) (State Enterprises), or (ii) Article
1502(3)(a) (Monopolies and State Enterprises) where the monopoly has acted in a manner
inconsistent with the Party's obligations under Section A, the investor may not allege the
breach in an arbitration under this Section.
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to Chapter 11. If a claim has previously been brought before a local court or administra-
tive body in Mexico, the Mexican Government can invoke Annex 1120.1 to prevent a claim
from going to arbitration.
In evaluating whether the Government of Mexico could successfully invoke the appli-
cation of the Annex, two factors come into play. First, for the restriction to be effective, the
allegations made before any local court or administrative body must in some form address
the issue of the Mexican government having breached its Chapter I 1 obligations with
respect to the concession. If an allegation of expropriation is not addressed in the Mexican
courts, it is doubtful that access to a Chapter 11 arbitration on the expropriation claim
would be precluded by Annex 1120.1.
Second, the Government of Mexico must determine how and when to advance the
argument that the investors' arbitration claim is precluded by Annex 1120.1. One option is
to raise this argument with the arbitration panel itself. It has been well established that
arbitrators may determine their own jurisdiction. 116 Having the arbitral panel determine
whether the arbitration was barred by Annex 1120.1 may be advantageous to the Mexican
government. Because the determination would be made in an arbitration proceeding
rather than in a courtroom, the arbitrators' decision would be confidential. 117 Having the
arbitrators resolve the issue before the actual arbitration began could avoid an expensive
and potentially lengthy arbitration, saving both sides money and possibly negative publici-
ty. However, the mere existence of an arbitration would obviously leave some observers
with the impression, however inaccurate, that Mexico is hostile to foreign investment.
In the alternative, Mexico might consider initiating litigation immediately in the
United States in an effort to preclude arbitration on the basis of Annex 1120.1. Mexico
could file a motion to enjoin the U.S. investors from proceeding with arbitration. As an
analogue, courts have held in numerous cases, citing the Federal Arbitration Act,118 that
they have the authority to determine whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists in a par-
ticular situation and, if it does exist, the scope of that agreement. 119 Of course, the possi-
116. See, e.g., AT&T Technologies, Inc. V Communications Workers of America et aL, 475 U.S. 643,
106 S.Ct. 1415 (1986) (holding that, although the question of whether both parties have
agreed to submit a dispute to arbitration is a question for the judiciary, the arbitrators are to
decide whether particular aspects of a claim preclude arbitration in that instance.); Smith
Barney Shearson, Inc. v. Boone, 47 F. 3d 750 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that the judiciary is to
decide whether the subject matter of a particular dispute was included in an arbitration
clause, but the arbitrators are to decide whether procedural circumstances preclude the use of
arbitration in a particular case); First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan, 115 S.Ct. 1920 (1995) (dis-
cussing whether the parties agreed to submit the question of the arbitrability of their underly-
ing dispute to arbitration or to the court.).
117. For a discussion of the confidentiality accorded to alternative dispute resolution, see generally,
Smith v. Smith etal., 154 F.R.D. 661 (N.D. Tex. 1994).
118. 9 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq. (1995). The Act empowers U.S. courts to stay judicial proceedings when
the issues involved are referable to arbitration pursuant to a written agreement.
119. See, e.g., Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood 6 Conklin Manufacturing Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404, 87 S.Ct.
1801, 1806 (1967); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 105 S.Ct.
3346, 3353 (1985); Merrill Lynch Commodities, Inc. v. Richal Shipping Corp., 581 F.Supp. 933,
936 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), citing Prudential Lines, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 704 E 2d 59, 63 (2nd Cir.
1983) ("the question of whether the dispute is covered by the arbitration agreement is for the
courts to decide").
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bility exists that a U.S. court would rule against Mexico's request, perhaps acting on a gen-
eral policy of deferring to arbitration. 120 On the other hand, the clarity of the language of
Annex 1120.1 makes it seem likely that a U.S. court would be bound to enjoin arbitration
on a finding that the U.S. investors had previously made their claim of expropriation in
proceedings before a Mexican judicial or administrative body.12 1
A third alternative would be to submit the Annex 1120.1 issue to the Free Trade
Commission set up under Chapter 20 of the NAFTA ("Institutional Arrangements and
Dispute Settlement Procedures"). The Free Trade Commission (the "Commission") is
charged with, inter alia, resolving disputes that may arise regarding the interpretation or
application of NAFTA provisions. 122 Chapter 20 establishes a mechanism by which
Parties may request the establishment of an arbitral panel "to examine, in the light of the
relevant provisions of the Agreement, the matter referred to the Commission .. . and to
make findings, determinations and recommendations... :,123 In addition, Article 1132
provides that, where a disputing Party asserts as a defense that the measure alleged to be a
breach is within the scope of a reservation or exception set out in Annexes I-IV of the
Agreement, the arbitral Tribunal may request the interpretation of the Free Trade
Commission on the issue. Commission interpretations are to be issued within 60 days and
are binding on the Tribunal. 124 The intentional and direct overlap between Chapter 11
and Chapter 20 makes a submission to the Free Trade Commission a viable alternate
approach to the Annex 1120.1 issue.
Whatever the forum in which the Government of Mexico chooses to advance its argu-
ment that arbitration is precluded by Annex 1120.1, the Annex's prohibition on taking
"two bites of the apples" seems clear-cut. Until NAFTA investors in Mexico become famil-
iar with it, Annex 1120.1 is likely to deny access to international arbitration for at least
some investment disputes.
120. See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25,
- 103 S.Ct. 927, 941 (1983) ("the Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any
doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration,
whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allega-
tion of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.").
121. This could be analogized to a party waiving its rights to arbitrate by participating in litigation
before the courts. See, e.g. Price v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc, 791 F. 2d 1156, 1158 (5th Cir.
1986); Miller Brewing Company v. Fort Worth Distributing Co., 781 F. 2d 494, 498 (5th Cir.
1986) (holding that, like any other contract right, the right to arbitration may be waived, and
that waiver may be found when the party seeking arbitration has substantially invoked the
judicial process to the detriment or prejudice of the other party.).
122. Art. 2001. In addition, Article 2020 of the NAFTA provides that Parties may request the Free
Trade Commission's response on the interpretation or application of any provision of the
NAFTA that has arisen in any domestic judicial or administrative proceedings of a NAFTA
party. Upon receipt of such a request, the Free Trade Commission "shall endeavor to agree on
an appropriate response as expeditiously as possible:' The Party in whose territory the court
or administrative body is located is responsible for submitting any agreed interpretation of the
Commission to the appropriate court or administrative body.




Any investment dispute that arises between one NAFTA Party and investors of another
Party will necessarily also involve a strong political component. The political climate and
relationship between the governments of the disputing NAFTA Party and the Party of the
investors at the time of the dispute will have a role, whether subtle or less-than-subtle, in the
manner in which the dispute is resolved. Political factors may be used as a strategic tool, or
even as a weapon, by the parties as they engage in the consultations, negotiations or arbitra-
tion that is held pursuant to Chapter 11. The degree of political pressure involved may, in
effect, determine whether a dispute ever gets to the arbitration stage or whether it is
resolved more quietly in consultations, and, of course, it can also determine for what sum of
money or other compensation the parties ultimately decide to settle their dispute.
Disputing parties will quickly seek to gain political advantage at the local and the federal
levels, and at the administrative and the executive branches, of government In addition to
any other legal counsel they may have engaged with respect to the investment dispute, partic-
ularly for their litigation skills, the parties are likely find themselves in need of counsel who
know the ins and outs of setting up meetings and lobbying with the appropriate government
officials and policymakers. The politics undeniably will play an important role.
For example, in the hypothetical investment dispute we described above, involving
U.S. investors who entered into a concession agreement with the government in Mexico,
the investors' lobbying efforts would most likely center on one message, however outdated
or inaccurate it might be. The investors would launch a lobbying campaign that would
most likely portray Mexico as being hostile to foreign investment and unreasonable in its
dealing with U.S. business people. They may attempt to paint a picture of less than honest
government officials who deliberately interfered with the investors' performance so as to
turn over the concession to favored Mexican investors, raising the time-worn fears that it is
"impossible" to do business in Mexico (or at least to do it honestly).
The U.S. investors' lobbying efforts will be aimed at certain members of the U.S.
Congress (from their home state, for example), the U.S. Commerce Department, the Office
of the United States Trade Representative, as well as the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City and
the Mexican Secretariat of Commerce and Industrial Development (SECOFI). Embassy
representatives would be relied upon to relay information about the facts of the invest-
ment and the dispute to government officials in the United States, including Members of
Congress and their staff. Members of Congress and their staff rely heavily on the Embassy
for information and opinions of events occurring in Mexico.
The investors may attempt to gain a windfall by intensifying their lobbying efforts
when other issues affecting U.S.-Mexico relations, such as monetary aid to Mexico or
immigration and border patrol problems, are being debated within Congress or the
Administration. Their tactic in this regard would be to pressure the Mexican Government,
such as by raising fears of a threatened relationship with the U.S. Government, so that
Mexico would feel obligated to enter into a settlement agreement with the U.S. investors to
avoid the negative connotations that might arise from an arbitration. Because Mexico has
taken great strides in the past decade to improve its foreign investment climate, the
Mexican Government would be sensitive to public accusations of having violated the
NAFTrAs investment provisions. To place further pressure on Mexico, the investors may
try to convince the U.S. Government to submit an "amicus curae" brief on their behalf to
the arbitration tribunal, pursuant to Article 1128 of the NAFTA. This provision allows
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Parties to make submissions to an arbitration tribunal on a question of interpretation of
the NAFTA. All of these tactics would be aimed at persuading Mexico to settle the
investors' claim to avoid going to arbitration.
Of course, the Mexican Government would also want to engage in lobbying efforts, to
counteract political damage being done by the U.S. investors and as a dispute settlement
strategy of its own. Mexico would want to convey its side of the story to Members of the
U.S. Congress, Administration officials, and Embassy officials. Its initial goal would be to
remove any U.S. Government pressure on it that might result from the investors getting a
head start in conveying their side of the story. Mexico would want to "level the playing
field" in terms of public and official sentiment about the dispute in order to improve its
chances of obtaining realistic and reasonable settlement offers from the investors. Another
goal would be to persuade the U.S. Government to make an Article 1128 submission to the
tribunal on Mexico's behalf, rather than on behalf of the U.S. investors, or, alternatively, to
persuade the United States not to make a submission on behalf of either party. Without
the backing of the U.S. Government in the form of such a submission, the U.S. investors
would be more likely to be reasonable in settlement negotiations. Mexico would want to
avoid political pressure by the U.S. Government that is perverted by reason of factual dis-
tortions, which could force Mexico into a settlement that is unrealistic or unfair. So as not
to mar the country's improving reputation as a place to do business, Mexico would want to
make clear to U.S. Government officials and policymakers that the concession was can-
celled for performance issues and breach of contract problems, not by any expropriatory
act on its part. By getting their side of the story across to the U.S. Government, Mexico
might be able to diffuse the political weapon that the investors were attempting to craft out
of the arbitration provisions of Chapter 11.
Moreover, Mexico's message could also be that this investment dispute is one for
which the applicable laws and international agreements have contemplated use of a partic-
ular dispute resolution procedure. That procedure should be allowed to run its course
outside the political arena; the NAFTA should be allowed to work.
IV. Conclusion.
Examining the content and practical effect of NAFTA Chapter 11 through the per-
spective of a hypothetical investment dispute provides several lessons for operating in a
NAFTA environment. It teaches, for example, that the NAFTA Parties should take steps to
ensure that all local and state or provincial government bodies are thoroughly familiar
with their obligations under Chapter 11. The NAFTA Parties would also be wise to estab-
lish sound mechanisms to review carefully (to the extent allowed under the NAFTA) the
financial and personal backgrounds of potential investors to identify possible performance
problems once an investment has been made. The NAFTA Parties should also make cer-
tain that any government action that has the effect of terminating an investment, such as
the nullification of a concession agreement, be done for commercial, and not political, rea-
sons. Finally, the NAFTA Parties must ensure that all enforceable procedures and rules of
law are followed in any judicial or administrative hearing relating to an investment dispute
under the NAFTA, in order to avoid investors' claims of a denial of due process.
To better their position in the event of an investment dispute, NAFTA investors in
Mexico should remain aware of the restriction on standing imposed by Annex 1120.1. The
investors should thus decide carefully whether to pursue remedies before a Mexican court
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or administrative body or via an international arbitration under Chapter 11. The investors
should also be prepared to document and substantiate any damages they claim in an
investment dispute. As a preventative measure, the NAFTA investors should, of course, be
fully aware of the performance obligations they are undertaking when they enter into an
investment deal and should perform as required under the concession or other type of
investment.
As we have seen, a downside to Chapter 11 can be said to exist in the potential for
investors to abuse the dispute settlement provisions by using political pressure and the
threat of public humiliation - such as by labelling the host government as hostile to for-
eign investment- to gain an advantage in settlement negotiations. Despite that potential,
the investment provisions of the NAFTA should be regarded as overwhelmingly positive
for U.S., Canadian, and Mexican investors in the NAFTA territory. Perhaps most signifi-
candy, Chapter 11 contains Mexico's first commitment to submit investment disputes to
international arbitration. The process provided by Chapter 11 to bypass local court or
administrative systems and instead to invoke an international arbitration mechanism is
enormously positive news for investors, given the considerable differences between the
legal systems of the NAFTA Parties. Only experience will show what the practical effects of
implementation of the NAFTA investment provisions will be. There should be no doubt,
however, that the foundation for a fair and nondiscriminatory investment climate for and
among the NAFTA Parties has been laid.
